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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the long run properties of intertemporal distortions in a broad class of second best
economies. Our unified framework encompasses and extends many well known models, such as variants
of the Ramsey taxation model with aggregate or idiosyncratic risk, and economies with incentive compatibility
constraints due to limited commitment, political economy, self-enforcement or private information,
or combinations of these. We identify a sufficient condition that rules out permanent intertemporal
distortions: If there exists an allocation that satisfies all constraints and eventually converges to the
limiting first best allocation, then intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second best. This result
uncovers a common optimality principle linking the intertemporal allocation of resources with the
ability to frontload distortions for this broad class of environments. A series of applications illustrates
the significance of these findings.
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The intertemporal allocation of resources has implications for aggregate income, risk sharing, asset
pricing, and other key areas of interest in macroeconomics. If feasibility were the only constraint,
then it would be possible to attain a fully e cient - ﬁrst best - allocation. In reality, a variety of
additional constraints imply that the allocation cannot be fully e cient and will feature distortions.
This paper studies the long run behavior of intertemporal distortions in a broad class of constrained-
e cient - second best - economies.
Many possible sources of frictions can constrain the allocation of resources. Perhaps the most
immediate of these is taxes. The Ramsey model provides a benchmark for optimal taxation in
macroeconomics. Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) ﬁrst established that capital income taxes are
zero in the steady state and all intertemporal distortions eventually vanish, a ﬁnding that has been
conﬁrmed for a variety of more general Ramsey models.1 Another natural source of distortions is
private information. The resulting incentive problems generate permanent intertemporal distortions,
as the recent work on dynamic contracting has emphasized.2 For other frictions, such as self-
enforcement, limited commitment, political economy, incomplete markets and so on, results di er
on the desirability of long-run intertemporal distortions.
Why are permanent intertemporal distortions ruled out in some environments? What is di erent
about economies where they are optimal? To explore these questions for a broad class of second
best economies, we propose a uniﬁed framework that encompasses and extends many well known
models. We allow for a general formulation of the constraints on resource allocation, which we
refer to as admissibility constraints. We can capture variants of the Ramsey taxation model with
aggregate or idiosyncratic risk, as well as economies with incentive compatibility constraints due
to limited commitment, political economy, self-enforcement or private information. Our framework
includes also settings that combine these constraints with arbitrary restrictions, such as incomplete
markets and borrowing constraints on the government or on private agents.
Our general analysis uncovers a common optimality principle linking the intertemporal allo-
cation of resources with the ability to front-load distortions. Speciﬁcally, the only rationale for
intertemporal distortions is to relax future admissibility constraints. We show that when it is pos-
sible to front-load all distortions, future admissibility constraints eventually will stop binding and
intertemporal distortions will be temporary. Front-loading all distortions may not be possible in
some second best economies, and intertemporal distortions may then be permanent.
Formally, we identify a su cient condition that rules out permanent intertemporal distortions:
If there exists an allocation that satisﬁes all admissibility constraints and that eventually converges
to the limiting ﬁrst best allocation, then intertemporal distortions are temporary in the second
1Chari and Kehoe (1999) and Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) extend the Chamley-Judd result for a broad
class of deterministic economies. Zhu (1992) and Farhi (2007) show that it holds also with aggregate uncertainty for
complete and incomplete markets, respectively.
2Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) and Rogerson (1985) were the ﬁrst to show that intertemporal distortions arise
in dynamic disability insurance and moral hazard models. Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) prove that
intertemporal distortions prevail in a large class of private information economies.
1best. Importantly, the su cient condition is a property of the set of admissible allocations, and not
a property of the optimum. The condition does not imply that the second best will converge to
the ﬁrst best limiting allocation. Intratemporal distortions depend on the history of past binding
constraints and typically do not vanish in the long run.
For example, our su cient condition is satisﬁed in the standard Ramsey taxation model. Since
the government can save enough to ﬁnance all its expenditures from asset returns, eventually it
becomes possible to eliminate distortionary taxes and converge to the ﬁrst best steady state. In-
tertemporal distortions are temporary, but typically intratemporal distortions, such as labor income
taxes, will be present in the steady state. By contrast, the su cient condition generally does not
hold in private information economies, since the incentive compatibility constraints are not satisﬁed
at the ﬁrst best allocation. The need to relax future binding incentive compatibility constraints gen-
erates a rationale for distorting the intertemporal margin. This leads to permanent intertemporal
distortions and a front-loaded path of consumption.
Of course, since our condition is not necessary, there are economies with no intertemporal
distortions where the condition does not hold. The Ramsey model with a balanced budget is one
example. The su cient condition is not satisﬁed, yet capital income taxes may be zero in the long
run and in this case, intertemporal distortions will be temporary.3
This paper makes several contributions. Our uniﬁed framework o ers insight about how the
nature of admissibility constraints shapes intertemporal distortions. This can prove useful for both
normative and positive analysis of second best allocations. Consider intertemporal distortions from
a normative standpoint. The Ramsey framework has been challenged for its arbitrary restrictions
on ﬁscal instruments. Deriving constraints from primitive frictions, such as private information,
ensures all relevant trade-o s are considered and instills greater conﬁdence in the resulting policy
prescriptions.4 Yet, this approach does not identify the relevant trade-o  missing in the Ramsey
model. Our result makes clear that the ability to front-load all distortions in the Ramsey model
gives rise to this fundamental di erence, even as the optimal allocation front-loads distortions in
both environments. This ﬁnding fosters a deeper understanding of both models. In addition, our
focus on distortions rather than taxes leads to more general predictions.5
From a positive standpoint, our su cient condition is useful for establishing robust predictions on
the long-run properties of the intertemporal margin for di erent types of frictions. For example, for
economies with self-enforcement constraints, we show how the assumptions on the agents’ outside
option determine whether the su cient condition holds, and thus set the long run properties of
intertemporal distortions. This analysis reconciles the conﬂicting ﬁndings in the literature. We are
able also to derive a very general result for economies with a benevolent government who chooses
allocations under limited commitment. Our su cient condition holds in this environment, as the
3See Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999).
4See Kocherlakota (2005a) for an extensive discussion on this point.
5It also clariﬁes some contrasting results in the literature that are driven by speciﬁc assumptions on the decentral-
ization. As is well known, there may be many ways to implement constrained-e cient allocations with a combination
of taxes and trading restrictions in a decentralized arrangement. See Kocherlakota (2005b), Albanesi and Sleet (2006),
and Albanesi (2008) for a discussion.
2ﬁrst best allocation must dominate the outside option. Thus, limited commitment alone cannot
give rise to permanent intertemporal distortions.
Finally, the su cient condition is easy to verify and can be employed immediately to determine
whether a speciﬁc economy features permanent intertemporal distortions, without having to fully
characterize the solution. This is a big advantage, since many interesting second best environments
are rich and present considerable analytical and computational challenges. Knowledge of the limiting
behavior of the intertemporal margin can also be helpful when we want to solve the model fully,
since this property of the solution can be incorporated into the algorithm.
The paper is organized as follows. To illustrate possible admissibility constraints, Section 2
presents a number of examples of well known second best economies. Section 3 lays out the general
framework. The economy is populated by inﬁnitely lived agents with standard time separable
preferences deﬁned over consumption and labor. We allow for ex ante and ex post heterogeneity. The
production function is neoclassical and exhibits constant returns to scale, implying that the ﬁrst best
allocation is fully e cient and does not entail any intrinsic distortions. The second best problem is
formulated as a choice of feasible allocations subject to admissibility constraints.6 The admissibility
constraints are forward-looking and display limited history dependence. We also assume a number
of regularity conditions. These assumptions correspond to a generalized version of those typically
imposed in the particular second best economies that we aim to encompass. Speciﬁcally, we consider
exclusively economies where the second best allocation is interior and weakly converges. Since the
set of admissible allocations often is not convex, we generalize a condition in Ray (2002) that rules
out local maxima and inﬂexion points.
Section 4 formally proves the main result. The argument can be outlined as follows. We decom-
pose the second best problem into two stages. The ﬁrst stage shows that if all future admissibility
constraints on the allocation stop binding, the optimal allocation will feature only temporary in-
tertemporal distortions. The proof of this result is closely related to Zhu (1992). The su cient
condition plays a role in the second stage. We show that if it holds, the second best allocation is
such that all future admissibility constraints eventually stop binding. Our result follows.
Section 5 discusses several applications that show the signiﬁcance and applicability of our result.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Examples
We now present a number of canonical examples of second best economies designed to illustrate
the structure of the di erent admissibility constraints. We also include a short discussion noting
whether our su cient condition is satisﬁed in these models.
6This formulation follows in the tradition of the primal approach to optimal taxation, pioneered in Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
32.1 Ramsey taxation model
Taxes are perhaps the most immediate source of distortions in the allocation of resources. The
Ramsey model has been the benchmark for the analysis of optimal taxation in macroeconomics.7
In this framework, a benevolent government sets proportional labor and capital income taxes to
ﬁnance an exogenous stream of government consumption. The government has commitment and
can issue debt of di erent maturities. Crucially, lump-sum taxes are ruled out, which implies that
the ﬁrst best allocation cannot be attained.
The constraints on ﬁscal instruments that deﬁne the Ramsey approach generally can be expressed
in terms of allocations, an approach that greatly simpliﬁes the analysis. For example, admissible
allocations in a Ramsey model with a representative agent and no uncertainty are fully characterized
by the following implementability constraint:
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This constraint is derived by combining the government intertemporal budget constraint with the
competitive equilibrium conditions for households and ﬁrms. Since consumption and labor decisions
in the future a ect the present value of tax revenues, the implementability constraint is forward-
looking.
In stochastic economies, admissible allocations can be characterized also in terms of a single
implementability constraint as long as markets are complete. However, if the government can issue
















= bt 1 + Vt, (2)
where bt 1 is the return on debt carried into period t, Vt is the present value of non-negative transfers,
and Rt is the after-tax return on capital.8 Even if constraint (2) cannot be expressed solely in terms
of allocations, the dynamics of debt are decoupled from the forward-looking component that involves
the continuation allocation.
Ramsey models generally satisfy the su cient condition. As long as the government can save,
there exists an allocation that converges to the ﬁrst-best steady state. More precisely, it is possible to
design a policy in which tax revenues exceed government spending until the income from government
assets grows enough to ﬁnance government expenditures. At this point, there is no further need to
raise tax revenues, and since taxes are the only source of distortions, the steady state that would
prevail under lump sum taxes can be attained. We discuss this property more extensively in Section
5.1.
7Chari and Kehoe (1999) provide an excellent review of this approach.
8See Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppala (2003) and Farhi (2007) for an analysis of the Ramsey model under
incomplete markets. For simplicity we have omitted the dependence on each variable on the history of shocks.
42.2 Risk Sharing
Incentive-constrained risk sharing is a classic example of a second best problem. Ex ante identical
agents face idiosyncratic shocks to productivity or preferences. The ﬁrst best allocation provides
agents with full insurance against these shocks. However, additional frictions such as limited com-
mitment or asymmetric information imply that full insurance typically is not attainable.
2.2.1 Self-enforcement constraints
Kocherlakota (1996) is perhaps one of the best known models of incomplete risk sharing under
limited commitment. To demonstrate the implications of this friction, we extend his environment
to include capital accumulation.
The economy is populated by two ex ante identical agents, i =1 ,2, inﬁnitely lived, with standard
preferences deﬁned over sequences of consumption, c, and labor, l. The agents face idiosyncratic
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where  i denotes the Pareto weight on agent i. Resource feasibility requires:
c1,t + c2,t + kt+1   F(kt,l t),
for all t   0, where lt = l1,t+l2,t denotes aggregate labor in e ciency units. The production function
F(·) is increasing in both arguments, strictly concave and homogeneous of degree one.
The ﬁrst best allocation fully insures agents from their idiosyncratic shocks. The ratio of the
marginal utility of consumption across agents is constant over time, and for each agent the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and labor is equal to their labor productivity. Thus, high
productivity agents supply more labor for standard preferences.
Under limited commitment, an agent may have an incentive to deviate from a risk-sharing
arrangement in a state when she has high productivity. If she deviates, she has access to an outside
option, Vout(kt) , which we assume to depend only on the level of aggregate capital.9 Thus any
second best allocation must satisfy a self-enforcement constraint that imposes for each date that
the present value of utility from continuing with the allocation is greater that the utility associated













  Vout(kt), (3)
for i =1 ,2 and  t   0.
9There are many possible formulations of the outside option, which we discuss in detail in Section 5.2.1.
5The self-enforcement constraint restricts the continuation allocation in each period, and thus is
forward looking. Each agent’s self-enforcement constraint depends only on the value of the outside
option and her own continuation allocation. The constraint can be relaxed by allocating more





i,t+j}j 0(kt) be a resource-feasible allocation that maximizes social welfare from time
t onwards with aggregate capital given by kt. We will refer to this object as a continuation ﬁrst
best allocation from kt. The su cient condition holds for this model if the ﬁrst-best continuation















  Vout(kt), (4)
for i =1 ,2.
Since the continuation ﬁrst best allocation features full consumption insurance, at the utilitarian
ﬁrst-best allocation, the su cient condition is satisﬁed for high enough values of  , as in Kocher-
lakota (1996). If however Pareto weights are su ciently asymmetric then condition (4) may not be
satisﬁed even if   approaches 1.
2.2.2 Private information
We now consider the same economy under the assumption that the idiosyncratic preference shocks,  ,
are private information. This is a version of the environment considered in Golosov, Kocherlakota
and Tsyvinski (2003), without aggregate shocks. The ﬁrst best allocation is the same as in the
previous example.
Agents at time t are characterized by their history of productivity shocks, denoted with  t =
{ 0, 1,..., t}. Thus, an allocation is a mapping that speciﬁes consumption as a function of the
history: {ci( t),l i( t)}
i=1,2
t 0 . Private information implies that allocations must satisfy a truth-telling
requirement known as incentive compatibility constraint:
Et
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 tu(ci(˜  t),l i(˜  t)/ t)
 
, (5)
 ˜  t, t and for i =1 ,2. This constraint is forward looking and involves restrictions across allocations
awarded to di erent ex post types,  t. Capital does not enter this constraint directly, in contrast to
(3).
Incentive compatibility requires individual consumption to be correlated with the realized en-
dowment. Absent this correlation, agents will report a low value of  . The ﬁrst best allocation
does not satisfy (5) if utility is strictly concave and the endowment process does not exhibit any
absorbing states. Thus, the su cient condition typically does not hold.
63 General Framework
We start by describing the economy and deﬁning the best feasible allocation, which corresponds to
our notion of ﬁrst best. We then introduce our general formulation for the admissibility constraints
and the corresponding concept of second best allocation.
3.1 The Economy
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy where time is discrete t =0 ,1,... The economy is populated
by a continuum of agents who may be ex-ante heterogeneous. Let I be the ﬁnite set of ex-ante types,
each denoted by subscript i   I, and  i > 0 the measure of agents of ex-ante type i, with
 
I  i =1 .
Aggregate shocks are denoted by zt   Z, where Z is a ﬁnite set. Let zt = {z0,z 1,...,zt} be the
history of aggregate shocks from date 0 up to date t, and z    Z  denotes an inﬁnite history. The
set of continuation histories from node ˜ zd at a later date t   d is denoted with:
Zt|˜ zd  
 
zt   Zt|zd =˜ zd
 
.
We adopt this notational convention for all variables.
Aggregate shocks are governed by a ﬁrst-order Markov process  z. The probability measure of




. Since Z is a ﬁnite set the probability measure
is well deﬁned for all subsets of Zt and Z .
We also allow for idiosyncratic shocks, so agents may be ex-post heterogeneous. Let  t    
denote the idiosyncratic shock at date t, where   is a ﬁnite set. The agent type at any date t is
given by the ex-ante type i and the history of idiosyncratic shocks  t    t.
Idiosyncratic shocks are governed by the ﬁrst-order Markov process    and are independent from
the aggregate shock zt and the agent ex-ante type. We also assume a law of large numbers holds,
so   
 
 t 
is also the measure of agents with type  t at date t.
Let st = {zt, t}, with st   S = Z    , summarize the aggregate state and idiosyncratic state.
Since aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are independent, state st evolves stochastically according










We assume that the Markov transition matrices for both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks
are strictly positive component-wise. This guarantees that there is a unique ergodic distribution
associated with the exogenous state st.10




be the consumption of ex-ante type i   I after a sequence of idiosyncratic shocks




10See Theorem 11.4 in Stokey and Lucas (1989). Our results also hold for Markov processes with absorbing states
and multiple ergodic distributions. We adopt this more restrictive formulation for ease of exposition.





  [0,¯ c].
Let C   [0,¯ c]
|I  | where |I    | denotes the cardinality of the set. The distribution of consumption









  [0,¯ c]:i   I
 
.







: st   St,t  0
 
.
Hence, c   C  and since C is compact, c   l  with the sup norm.
A continuation consumption allocation from node st or st   St and t>0, denoted with c|st, is
a plan specifying consumption for every ex ante type at each continuation node from st:
c|st =
 
c(sd):sd   Sd|st,d  t
 
.







. Following the notational convention for
consumption, similarly we can deﬁne l
 
st 
, L, l, and l|st. It will be useful to collect the consumption











zt, t  
.
We let X = C   L and follow the notational convention to deﬁne x
 
st 








  K denote the amount of aggregate capital available at node zt   Zt|zt 1.






: zt   Zt,t  0
 
,
for given initial value, k 1. The allocation for aggregate capital, k, belongs to K    l .A
continuation allocation for aggregate capital will be denoted with k|zt.
The allocation for individual capital is denoted with y. Speciﬁcally, let yi(st 1)   [0, ¯ y] be the
amount of capital held by ex-ante type i at node st 1, and
y(st 1)=
 
yi(st 1)   [0, ¯ y]:i   I
 
,
be the distribution of capital across ex-ante agents at node st 1. The initial distribution of individual






: zt   Zt,t  0
 
.
8Deﬁnition 1 An allocation   is a triple {x,y,k}  X    Y     K . Let   be the set of all such
allocations.
Given an allocation  , we can construct a corresponding sequence of probability measures
{µt}
 
t=0 over the Borel sets of X    Y     K . We will use the notation µt   µ  to indi-
cate that the sequence {µt}
 
t=0 converges weakly to the probability measure µ , and we will refer
to µ  as the limiting measure.11
Output is produced by combining labor and capital according to a constant-returns-to-scale
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are aggregate consumption and labor respectively, and g : Z   [0, ¯ g] is an exogenous process
for government expenditures. The production function includes capital depreciation and satisﬁes
standard properties, as detailed in Assumption 2.
Assumption 2 The production function F is homogeneous of degree one, twice di erentiable, con-
cave and strictly increasing in labor and capital.



















Constraint (7) can be slack, to allow for a fraction of aggregate capital to be unassigned to any
individual agent.
Deﬁnition 2 An allocation       is feasible if the resource constraint (6) and the capital allocation
constraint (7) are satisﬁed for all zt   Zt, t   0. Let  F     be the set of feasible allocations.
For continuation allocations, feasibility must be deﬁned from a particular state {st,k(zt 1)}. A
continuation allocation  |st is feasible from state {st,k(zt 1)}, if the resource constraint (6) and
the capital allocation constraint (7) are satisﬁed for all zd   Zd|zt, d   t, for given k(zt 1)   K.
11A sequence {µt}
 
t=0 converges weakly to a probability measure µ  if limt   µt (B)=µ  (B) for all Borel sets




fdµ  for all continuous, bounded functions
f : K   X   Y    .
9Individual preferences over ﬂow allocations are represented by :
Ui (x;z0)=














where     (0,1) is the intertemporal discount factor and per-period utility function ui satisﬁes the
standard properties. While this formulation allows for heterogeneity in preferences, all agents are
restricted to share the same discount factor.




      is concave, twice
di erentiable, strictly increasing in consumption, and decreasing in labor.





with U : X     . This formulation can accommodate arbitrary Pareto weights over ex-ante types
I, which could be captured in the deﬁnition of Ui(·).
We can now provide a formal deﬁnition of a ﬁrst best allocation.
Deﬁnition 3 A feasible allocation  fb    F is ﬁrst best given initial conditions k0 and z0, if for





  U (x;z0).
A continuation ﬁrst best allocation from state {st,k(zt 1)} for st   St and k(zt 1)   K, denoted










zt 1  




zt 1  
,z t), (8)




zt 1  
.
The distribution of capital across agents is indeterminate in the ﬁrst best, since it is inconsequen-
tial for welfare or production e ciency under our assumptions. We can thus deﬁne the sequence of






, and its limit µ
fb
  over X  K,
with the understanding that for any ﬁrst best allocation,  fb, the associated sequence of probability
measures over X  K converges weakly to µ
fb
 . This also implies that for any ﬁrst best continuation




For the ﬁrst best allocation, feasibility is the only constraint on the allocation of resources. Most
interesting economic environments feature additional constraints, as discussed in Section 2, which
we refer to as admissibility constraints. We now introduce a general and abstract formulation for
10the admissibility constraints that captures a large class of second best economies. Our general
formulation comprises two classes of constraints. There are constraints on the allocation, possibly
at each date and state and for each ex ante type of agent. These are parameterized by an auxiliary
variable, which does not enter preferences or production but which may be necessary to formulate the
second best problem. The auxiliary variable is endogenous and may be subject to initial conditions
and to constraints on its law of motion. These make up the second set of constraints covered by
our general formulation.
Speciﬁcally, at each date t   0, for each aggregate shock history zt   Zt, each ex-post type
 t    t, and each ex-ante type i   I, there are {1,2,...,M} admissibility constraints on the















































































































bm,i : [0, ¯ x]
I   [0, ¯ y]
I   K   S    ,
h
j
m,i : [0, ¯ x]   S    ,
d
j
m,i : [0, ¯ x]   S    ,



















are twice di erentiable in every argument for all i   I,










  [0,¯ a]:i   I,m   M
 
,
11collects the relevant values of the auxiliary variable for node st   St, t   0. Let A = [0,¯ a]
|I M|  
 |I M| be the space for a
 
st 






: st   St,t  0
 
  A .
The auxiliary variable corresponds to assets or other endogenous state variables that do not enter
production or preferences but are necessary for deﬁning the second best allocation problem. The
implementability constraints in the Ramsey model with incomplete markets in equation (2) are one
example of this use. In this case, the auxiliary variable can be deﬁned as a vector comprising values
of bt 1 and Vt. It can also capture time, state and agent variation in the admissibility constraints
(9). The path of the auxiliary variable may itself be subject to constraints, stemming from asset
trading restrictions and so on. We formalize these as follows. We say that a plan for the auxiliary












with a0   A0   A at date t =0 .
The correspondence  : A   S   A governs the law of motion for the auxiliary variable. We
restrict   to be convex. Since for most second best economies, the auxiliary variable will correspond
to assets with linear laws of motion, the condition will be satisﬁed for most problems of interest.
Assumption 5 The correspondence  ( ,s):A S   A is continuous, convex, and its image is a
convex subset of  I M including   for all s   S and     A.
We can now formally deﬁne the notion of a second best allocation for our economy.
Deﬁnition 4 A feasible allocation      F is admissible if there exists a plan for the auxiliary
variable a   A, with a0   A0, such that for all dates t   0, all st   St: (i) the allocation,  , satisﬁes
(9) for m =1 ,2,...,M and i =1 ,2,...,I; (ii) the plan for the auxiliary variable, a, satisﬁes (11).
Let  A be the set of admissible allocations.
Deﬁnition 5 A second best allocation is an admissible allocation    given initial conditions k0 and
z0, if for all admissible allocations      A:
U (x ;z0)   U (x;z0).
If the ﬁrst best allocation  fb is admissible, the admissibility constraints will never be binding
and the second best problem is trivial. To distinguish this case, we introduce the concept of proper







Let us brieﬂy discuss our formulation for the admissibility constraints (9) and (11). The con-








, and on the agent’s decisions and type. For example, the term bm,i can
capture the value of an outside option for economies with limited commitment constraints on the
government or private agents. The term h0
m,i is purely forward-looking, since it includes only the
continuation allocation for consumption and labor. This term is intended to capture admissibility
constraints that have this feature, such as the implementability constraints in Ramsey taxation mod-
els or the value of an allocation on the equilibrium path for a setting with participation conditions.
Finally, the term in h1
m,i allows us to incorporate constraints on the allocation awarded to di erent
ex post types of agents. Such restrictions arise in settings with constraints on redistribution or
risk-sharing. Implementability constraints in private information economies are a typical example,
as discussed in Section 2.2.2.12 The terms d
j
m,i allow us to capture endogenous discount factors
that depend on marginal utilities. These terms often appear in intertemporal budget constraints.
Finally, the auxiliary variable enters linearly in the admissibility constraints (9). This is without
loss of generality, as the auxiliary variable could be deﬁned as dependent on endogenous variables.
For example, it could be given by the product of asset holdings weighed by marginal utility, and
this deﬁnition could itself be captured in (9).13
While the formulation of H
 
 ,st 
enables us to capture a broad class of second best economies,
it imposes structure on the degree of history dependence of the admissibility constraints. First, the
constraint at each node cannot be arbitrarily backward-looking. Second, the value of endogenous
state variables at future dates does not enter the admissibility constraint at the current date. These
assumptions are clearly restrictive. For example, a Ramsey taxation model with the constraint that
taxes must be constant over time cannot be captured in (9).14 Finally, we impose that the forward
looking terms h0
m,i and h1
m,i are time-separable and discounted at the same rate as utility.
The speciﬁcation for the constraints on the law of motion of the auxiliary variable, (11), is
similarly motivated. The correspondence   can capture constraints on individual or aggregate
asset positions, or on their variation over time, as well as certain information constraints, such as
measurability conditions.15 As before there are some limitations embedded in our formulation. The
auxiliary variable must be multiplicatively separable with the terms in H, and the deﬁnition of  
clearly rules out arbitrary history dependent constraints.
To complete the description of our general framework, we introduce some additional conditions
on the second best allocation. While in speciﬁc applications these assumptions can be stated in terms
of primitives, it is very di cult to identify such primitive restrictions for our general framework.
The ﬁrst assumption is a standard non-degenerate constraint qualiﬁcation. This is required in
12The baseline formulation of h
j
m,i only allows for one period cross-agent restrictions on the allocation. However,
it can easily be extended to include a ﬁnite number of terms h
j
m,i.
13The implementability constraint in a Ramsey model is a typical example, see (1) and (2) in Section 2.1.
14The restrictions on the structure of (9) do not rule out Ramsey models with incomplete factor taxation, such
as Correia (1996) and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997). These restrictions can be formulated with an admissibility
constraint as (9), by including an additional constraint at date t =0that prevents the government from manipulating
the present value of assets at date t =0 . See Armenter (2007) for a discussion.
15The formulation of the correspondence   can easily be extended to include a ﬁnite number lags of the auxiliary
variable.
13order to apply Lagrangian methods and is based on the deﬁnition of regular point in Luenberger
(1969). We assume also that the second best allocation is interior. This excludes constrained-
e cient allocations that involve corner solutions.16




for all i   I,m   M, and belongs to the interior of X   K   Y .
The set of admissible allocations is not convex for many second best problems. The strategy
for resolving this issue varies by application. Often, su ciency is veriﬁed numerically or additional
model-speciﬁc conditions are imposed to guarantee global optimality.17 Our formulation can en-
compass non-convex problems, under a regularity condition to rule out local maxima and inﬂexion
points. We adopt a weaker and more general version of the conditions assumed in Ray (2002) for
a dynamic principal-agent model with limited commitment. He imposes that any improvable ad-
missible allocation can be improved upon locally.18 Since we focus on the limiting behavior of the
allocations, we express the condition in terms of the limsup of the admissibility constraints. This
formulation guarantees that any admissible allocation that can be improved upon globally can be
eventually improved upon by a small amount.19
Assumption 7 Let  fb and    be a ﬁrst-best and second-best allocation respectively. For each i   I
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m,i    
fb
m,i,
with strict equality only if µ 
  = µ
fb
 .
Finally, we assume that the second best allocation converges weakly. As is well known, it is
hard to identify su cient conditions for convergence in many second best economies, and often
it is necessary to impose additional restrictions on the problem to guarantee convergence.20 This
di culty is compounded in a general framework like ours. We follow most of the literature and
assume that the second best allocation converges.
16For example, some private information economies display bunching. In this case, a subset of agents does not
supply labor. See Tuomala (1990) and Salanie (2003) for a discussion. If there is heterogeneity in discount factors,
consumption may converge to its lower bound in the second best. See Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) for
an example.
17For example, in private information models with labor choice, a single-crossing is imposed to ensure an ordering
of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor by types. This condition typically guarantees
convexity.
18Assumption A2, page 556 in Ray (2002).
19In practice we can relax the assumption even further: we only need the regularity condition to be satisﬁed by
binding admissibility constraints.
20For example, Judd (1985) presents the results conditional on convergence. Atkeson and Lucas (1995) introduce
a lower bound on utility which guarantees convergence in an economy with moral hazard and private information.
14Assumption 8 Let {µ 
t} be a sequence of probability measures associated with a second best allo-
cation   . The sequence {µ 
t} converges weakly to µ 
 .
4 Main Result
Our main result, derived in Theorem 1, identiﬁes a su cient condition that rules out permanent
intertemporal distortions in the class of second best economies encompassed by our framework.
The condition identiﬁes a property of the set of the admissible allocations, thus it can be veriﬁed
without solving for the second best allocation. It is also simple to state, given the generality of the
environment.
Condition 1 There exists an admissible allocation ˜   such that the associated sequence of probability
of measures {˜ µt} converges weakly to µ
fb
  for any set of initial conditions A0.
Condition 1 formalizes the idea that it is possible to front-load all distortions for some second best
problems. Clearly, if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the ﬁrst best limiting
allocation, for such an allocation all admissibility constraints must eventually be non-binding. The
existence of such an allocation is a property of the set of admissible allocations and does not imply
that this allocation solves the second best problem. However, Theorem 1shows that if Condition 1
holds, the second best allocation will not feature permanent intertemporal distortions.
We formalize the concept of intertemporal distortion as a wedge in the Euler equation for





















for all i   I and all st   St, t   0, where uc and Fk denote the derivative of u and F with respect
to c and k respectively. At the ﬁrst best allocation,  fb,  i
 
st 
=0for all agents and all nodes.




Abusing notation slightly, we extend the probability measure µ 




0 as follows. Consider the function:


















. Let  i the subset of the domain of f such that f   0. By







for µ  ( i).21
We can now state our main result.












15Theorem 1 Let    be a second best allocation and µ  be the associated sequence of probability
measures. If Condition 1 holds, then for each i   I either the intertemporal distortion is zero on





























The statement of Theorem 1 clariﬁes in what sense all intertemporal distortions are temporary
in the second best. While there may be a strictly positive or negative wedge along the transition
path, Theorem 1 implies that the wedge either converges to zero with probability one in the limit
or alternates in sign with positive probability. Thus, at the limiting second best allocation, the
intertemporal wedge is never strictly positive or strictly negative with probability one. For economies
without aggregate shocks, Theorem 1 implies that  Fk
ss =1at the steady state.
We prove Theorem 1 by decomposing the second best problem in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage,
we solve for the best admissible allocation taking as given the plan for the auxiliary variable. The
second stage characterizes the optimal path for the auxiliary variable. Formally, let  A (a)    F
be the set of feasible allocations such that the admissibility constraints (9) are satisﬁed at all nodes
st   St, t   0 for given a   A  .
Deﬁnition 6 Let W (a):A    be given by
W (a) = sup
 
U (x;s0):     A (a)
 
. (14)
By Assumption 3, the utility function ui is bounded above and below for all i   I as it is
di erentiable over a compact set. Thus W (a) also is bounded above and below for all auxiliary
variable plans.22 Clearly, if an admissible allocation    is second best then there exists a    A 
such that
W (a )=U (x ;s0)
and {  ,a  } satisfy the admissibility constraints.
This decomposition of the second best problem imparts an intuitive structure to the proof of
Theorem 1 and makes interpreting the results easier. In the ﬁrst stage, we show that if all future
admissibility constraints are non-binding, then all intertemporal distortions must be temporary.
This result, derived in Proposition 1 , establishes a link between permanent intertemporal distortions
and the need to relax future binding admissibility constraints. Proposition 1 is very general, since
the proof is based on a simple variational argument. Condition 1 is not used in this step of the
proof.
22Technically,  
A (a) may be empty and then W (a)=  but this case is clearly of no interest.
16The second stage characterizes the optimal path for the auxiliary variable and relies critically on
Condition 1. Speciﬁcally, the su cient condition connects the ability to front-load all distortions,
which is a property of the set of admissible allocations, with the limiting behavior of the admissibility
constraints at the optimum. Assumptions 5 and 7 also play an important role in the argument.
4.1 First stage: Choosing allocations
We start by analyzing the ﬁrst-stage problem (14) given the plan a  for the auxiliary variable.
Assumption 6 allows us to write the Lagrangian associated with the solution to (14) and derive the
set of ﬁrst order necessary conditions (f.o.n.c. henceforth). If there were no admissibility constraints




=0 . In other words, if there are no constraints on the allocation of resources, the ﬁrst order
welfare e ect of an additional unit of resources transferred from date t to date t +1at rate Fk,t+1




transferring resources across periods tightens or relaxes future admissibility constraints, leading to
a ﬁrst order e ect on welfare.
A key insight from the analysis of the ﬁrst-stage problem is that the presence of intertemporal
distortions is driven only by future binding admissibility constraints. Instead, current and past
binding admissibility constraints, instead, are responsible for distortions in intratemporal margins,
such as labor supply decisions. At the limiting second best allocation, the welfare e ects associated
with intratemporal distortions are, to a ﬁrst-order approximation, symmetric across periods and do
not generate a ﬁrst-order welfare e ect in connection to resource transfers across periods. Thus, we
can rule out permanent intertemporal distortions if the admissibility constraints are not binding at
future dates.
To formalize this reasoning, we deﬁne for each node a set of continuations at which all admissi-
bility constrains are not binding. Given an allocation and auxiliary variable plan { ,a}, let
 m,i,t =
 













and  m,t =  I i,m,t,  t =  M m,t for all dates t   0.23 The set  t collects all the nodes of St
such that no admissibility constraint is binding for all respective continuation nodes. The set  t





st    t
  
is weakly increasing and converges.
We can now formally state the main result for the ﬁrst stage of the proof.
Proposition 1 Let    be a second best allocation, µ  be the associated sequence of probability





st    t
 
=1 ,
23For ease of notation, we maintain the dependence of the set on the allocation   and the auxiliary variable plan
aimplicit.





























Proof. In the Appendix.
We will use a simpliﬁed model to illustrate the reasoning behind Proposition 1. Consider a second
best economy with a representative agent, no uncertainty, and a single admissibility constraint for
each date t   0, given by:
b(kt)+
   
j=t
 j th(cj,l j)   at. (16)
For this step of the proof, as in problem (14), the path for the auxiliary variable {at} is taken as
given. We will analyze the choice of the plan for the auxiliary variable in Section B.
To see why only future admissibility constraints distort the intertemporal margin, consider
the ﬁrst order welfare e ect of transferring resources across periods. First, a marginal change in
consumption at date t may tighten certain admissibility constraints. To see this, assume hc
t > 0









   t (17)
where  t,  t+1, and  t+1 are the Lagrangian multipliers associated to the resource constraint and the
admissibility constraint (16) at t. The variable  t =
 t
j=0  t j j collects the Lagrangian multipliers
of all the admissibility constraints that feature the time t allocation {ct,l t}. If the current or any
past admissibility constraint are binding  t > 0, there is a wedge between the marginal value of
resources and the marginal utility of consumption. The wedge in (17) reﬂects the degree to which











a transfer of consumption from t to t +1will induce a ﬁrst order welfare loss. At the steady state,
this inequality will hold if  t <  t+1, that is, if the admissibility constraint at t +1is binding.
In addition, changes in the capital stock may directly a ect the admissibility constraint at date
t +1 . If the admissibility constraint is binding, there will be a wedge in the Euler equation for
18capital:
 t +  t+1bk
t+1 =   t+1Fk
t+1.
If bk
t+1 > 0, additional capital tightens the admissibility constraint at t+1and the wedge is positive.
Now consider a plan for the auxiliary variable such that the admissibility constraints from date
d onwards are not binding, so  t =0for all t   d. Evaluated at the steady-state, the wedge (17)















 d j j.
Once all admissibility constraints stop binding, intratemporal distortions depend on the constant
value, ¯  , which captures the fact that allocations at date t and t +1are subject to the same set
of admissibility constraints. Clearly, intratemporal distortions will persist in the long-run provided
any admissibility constraint was binding at some date, since this implies ¯   > 0. However, at the
steady state, equation (18) holds with equality, reﬂecting the fact that a shift in resources across
dates has an o setting ﬁrst-order welfare e ect on welfare. In addition, marginal changes in the
level of capital cannot a ect future admissibility constraints, since the constraints are not binding
and the standard Euler equation holds:
 t =   t+1Fk
t+1.
The implication of this argument is that a transfer of resources across two consecutive periods has
no ﬁrst order welfare e ects at the steady state if future admissibility constraints do not bind. It
follows that the marginal value of resources is equated across periods and there are no intertemporal
distortions at the steady state. This implies:  Fk
ss =1 .




leaves open the possibility that the second best allocation features a strictly positive or negative
wedge along the transition path. Since the stationary distribution may not be reached in ﬁnite
time, a strictly positive or negative intertemporal wedge at all nodes would be implied. Corollary 1
shows that if the sign of the wedge  i
 
st 
is constant along the transition path, then the wedge is
0 with probability one in the limit.
Corollary 1 Let    be a second best allocation, µ  be the associated sequence of probability mea-





st    t
 
=1 .
19If for any i   I, either: (i)  i
 
st 
> 0 for all st   St,t  0, or (ii)  i
 
st 











Proof. In the Appendix.
4.2 Second stage: Choosing the auxiliary variable
We now study the optimal choice of the plan for the auxiliary variable, which will denote with a .
It is here that we use Condition 1 to show that the admissibility constraints will be binding only for
a transitional phase. The argument proceeds in two steps. We ﬁrst derive two important properties
of the set of admissible plans for the auxiliary variable implied by Condition 1. We then use these
properties to show that the optimal plan for the auxiliary variable a  converges to a subset of A
where the admissibility constraints (9) do not bind.
Condition 1, combined with Assumption 5 and the compactness of A, can be used to derive
two important properties of the set of admissible plans for the auxiliary variable. We illustrate the
argument in the simpliﬁed model introduced in Section 4.1. We assume a simple formulation for
the correspondence  :
 (at) = [0,  (at)] (19)









denote the steady-state under the ﬁrst-best allocation. The su cient condition

















will, generally, not be optimal. However, its existence allows us to derive some key





is admissible, there must exist a path for the auxiliary variable, {ˆ at}, that can
support the ﬁrst best steady state. This requires constraint (16) to be satisﬁed by the ﬁrst best
steady state allocation to satisfy:
afb










1    
  ˆ at,
for all dates t   d for some date d. In addition, {ˆ at} will satisfy constraint (19) on the law of motion
of the auxiliary variable.
The sequence {ˆ at} thus deﬁnes a subset of A,
 




, that supports the ﬁrst-best steady
state. It also identiﬁes a path for the auxiliary variable that supports a ﬁrst best continuation from
any initial condition, since the admissibility constraints on the allocation, (16), and on the auxiliary
variable, (19), must be satisﬁed at each date.








{Hm,i( fb,s j)}   m,i  i,m
 
, (20)
where  fb is the ﬁrst best allocation. If Condition 1 holds, Afb is non-empty.
Proof. In the Appendix
Since Afb is non-empty, then by Assumption 5 for any  fb   Afb, the continuation plan t fb =
{ fb, fb,...} satisﬁes  fb    ( fb,s j)  sj   Sj|st, for j   t. This property implies that for any
a   A  such that a(st)   Afb for some st, then there is an admissible continuation plan for a from
st such that every element is in Afb. Thus, if Afb is non-empty, the ﬁrst best stationary allocation
can be supported by an admissible plan for the auxiliary variable.
We can now derive the second key property of the set of admissible plans for the auxiliary
variable implied by Condition 1. We will ﬁrst illustrate this result in the simpliﬁed model. Here,
the su cient condition immediately rules out the possibility that for all   < a
fb
ss we have   ( )    .
If this were the case, the existence of an auxiliary variable {ˆ at} such that ˆ at   a
fb
ss would be ruled
out. Thus, the su cient condition combined with Assumption 5, which requires  (·) to be convex
and   ( ) to be concave, immediately implies  ( ) >  for all   < a
fb
ss. In other words, it is always
possible to relax the admissibility constraints on the allocation in a one step continuation of the
plan for the auxiliary variable.
This property is derived formally for the general framework in Proposition 3. It connects Con-
dition 1, a global property of the set of admissible allocations, with a local property of the second
best plan for the auxiliary variable.
Proposition 3 Let Condition 1 hold. Then, for any     A, there exists a scalar     (0,1] and
     Afb, such that:
(1    )  +        ( ,s), (21)
for some s   S.
Proof. In the Appendix
If Proposition (21) did not hold, it would be possible to ﬁnd a separating hyperplane between
the set  (a,s) for all {a,s}  A   S and Afb. Then, by Assumption 5, the convexity of   would
imply that no point in the half-space containing  (a,s) could be the starting point of a path leading
to Afb, contradicting Proposition 2.
We now use these properties of the set of admissible plans for the auxiliary variables implied
by Condition 1 to show that the second best plan converges to Afb. The premise of this result is
21that, if at any date t an admissibility constraint is binding, relaxing such a constraint has a ﬁrst
order welfare gain. For the simpliﬁed model, as long as an admissibility constraint is binding at
date t, the optimal path for the auxiliary variable must feature a 






t 1, that is, it
must be strictly increasing. Thus, either the admissibility constraint will stop binding at some ﬁnite
date d or the auxiliary variable will converge to a
fb
ss. Our regularity conditions then ensure that if
a 
t   a
fb
ss, the Lagrangian multiplier on the admissibility constraint  t converges to 0.
The general framework features multiple admissibility constraints. Since there is no guarantee
relaxing all of these simultaneously is possible, the plan for the auxiliary variable need not be
monotone. However, Assumption 7 implies that an auxiliary variable plan a can always be improved
upon if it is in the interior of the image of the correspondence  . As in Ray (2002), this condition
rules out local maxima and inﬂexion points and plays a crucial role in the argument.
Proposition 4 establishes this result formally for the general framework.
Proposition 4 Let Condition 1 hold and    be a second best allocation such that µ 
   = µ
fb
 . Then,





st    t
 
=1 ,
and {  ,a  } are admissible and  t is deﬁned in (15).
The requirement µ 
   = µ
fb
  restricts the attention to proper second best allocations, for which
the limiting distribution does not converge to the ﬁrst best.
4.3 Combining the two stages
Finally, we combine the results from both stages to prove Theorem 1. If the su cient condition
holds, by Proposition 4 it is possible to front load all distortions. Thus, the second best plan calls for
eventually relaxing all future admissibility constraints. This implies that in the limit it is possible
to transfer resources across periods without raising further distortions. By Proposition 1, it follows
that permanent intertemporal distortions are not compatible with optimality.
5 Applications
We now discuss a series of application to illustrate the relevance of our result. Section 5.1 concen-
trates on Ramsey models and shows that the su cient condition generally holds if the government
can save enough. We also include two examples of Ramsey models with no permanent intertem-
poral distortions where Condition 1 does not hold. Section 5.2 examines economies with limited
risk-sharing. In models with self-enforcement constraints, we show how the assumptions on the out-
side option determine whether the su cient condition holds. For private information economies, we
show that typically the su cient condition does not hold, yet the optimal allocation still front-loads
distortions. Finally, Section 5.3 analyzes economies where the government is subject to a limited
22commitment constraint. We show that when the government is benevolent, Condition 1 is always
satisﬁed and there are no permanent intertemporal distortions. For a self-interested government,
we discuss the conditions under which the su cient condition holds.
5.1 Ramsey Taxation with Asset Constraints
The Ramsey taxation model rules out lump sum taxes. This restriction on ﬁscal instruments
prevents the economy from attaining the ﬁrst best allocation. But even without lump sum taxes, the
ﬁrst best steady state allocation can be attained if the government can save. By accumulating assets,
the government eventually can ﬁnance spending with interest revenues and forgo distortionary
taxes. Following this policy, though, requires maintaining a budget surplus for what could be a
long transition phase and typically is not optimal. It does satisfy the admissibility constraints that
characterize Ramsey policies. Hence, the su cient condition holds and we can apply Theorem 1. We
now discuss a series of speciﬁc Ramsey models in order to show the link between the government’s
ability to save and permanent intertemporal distortions.
We begin with the basic Ramsey model with a representative agent and no uncertainty. The
implementability constraint (1) is the only admissibility constraint, as discussed in Section 2.1. The
su cient condition holds if there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the ﬁrst best
steady state. This implies in turn that there exists a path for the auxiliary variable such that a ﬁrst
best continuation allocation is admissible from some date onwards.
Let ¯ a(kt) denote the minimum value of the auxiliary variable that supports a ﬁrst-best contin-
uation allocation from date t for kt   K. Evaluating constraint (1) at the ﬁrst-best continuation

















An admissible allocation that converges to the ﬁrst best steady-state is associated with a path for
the auxiliary variable such that at   ¯ a(kt) for some date t.24 We can derive the corresponding value
of government debt, ¯ b(kt), that sustains ¯ a(kt) from the competitive equilibrium conditions:







The level ¯ b(kt) will be negative, so a ﬁrst best continuation allocation is admissible if the government
can accumulate a su cient level of assets. A policy with relatively high labor and capital income
taxes for a transitional phase will lead to a level of debt such that bt < ¯ b(kt) at some date t, after
which the ﬁrst best continuation allocation from kt is admissible. Then, there will be no permanent
intertemporal distortions, based on Theorem 1. In the basic Ramsey model, this also implies that
the capital income tax is zero in the steady state.
Why would a government be unable to save? Assuming a closed economy, the government can
24To derive the full path of auxiliary variables we must write the full sequence of implementability constraints.
23save enough only if private agents can borrow enough. Denote with b
p
t the debt issued by private
agents. Bond market clearing requires b
p
t +bt =0at all dates. If a borrowing constraint is imposed
on private agents, b
p
t   B, this gives rise to a corresponding upper limit on government assets,
bt    B. This restriction will generate an additional admissibility constraint.25 If ¯ b(kt) <  B, the
ﬁrst-best continuation allocation cannot be supported from kt. If ¯ b(kt) <  B for all kt   K, then
the su cient condition is violated and the optimal allocation may feature intertemporal distortions.
While this example is very stylized, it carries a general lesson for Ramsey models. Borrow-
ing constraints on the government will not lead to positive capital taxes. Saving constraints on
the government and borrowing constraints on private agents may do so. This observation applies
also to Ramsey policies with incomplete markets. Farhi (2007) analyzes a Ramsey model with a
representative agent and risk-free debt. He ﬁnds that the limiting behavior of the second best allo-
cation depends critically on the upper limit imposed on government assets. Following Aiyagari et
al. (2002), debt and asset limits are labeled natural if they merely insure that obligations will be
paid back almost surely. More stringent limits are referred to as ad hoc.26 Under the natural asset
limit, the capital tax rate is either zero or ﬂuctuates around zero, and there are no intertemporal
distortions.27 Interpreting these ﬁndings in light of Theorem 1, the intertemporal wedge satisﬁes
(13) and thus there are no permanent intertemporal distortions. Instead, under an ad hoc asset
limit, the su cient condition is not satisﬁed and the capital tax is typically di erent from zero.
We now turn to Ramsey models where Condition 1 is not satisﬁed. Perhaps the most interesting
example is Aiyagari (1995). The economy features only idiosyncratic risk and markets are incom-
plete. Agents can accumulate capital and borrow subject to the constraint that their net worth is
positive. There are no explicit borrowing or saving constraints on the government. Aiyagari (1995)
shows that there are no permanent intertemporal distortions at the optimum. The intertempo-
ral Euler equation for individual consumption satisﬁes (13). At the aggregate level, the condition
1= F 
k holds at the limiting distribution. The su cient condition, though, is not satisﬁed. The
ﬁrst best allocation features full consumption insurance, which is not attainable given the restric-
tions on assets and ﬁscal instruments. Yet, the borrowing constraints on private agents do not
impose constraints on aggregate capital. Moreover, private agents can borrow against their capital
holdings as long as they maintain a positive net worth. As a result, the government can save enough
to support the ﬁrst best level of aggregate capital at the steady state. Thus, even if the su cient
condition is not satisﬁed, Aiyagari’s results underscore the principle that the government’s ability
to save is critical for intertemporal distortions in a Ramsey model. 28
25The additional constraint will shape the correspondence   governing the path for the auxiliary variable.
26Aiyagari et al. (2002) derive the limiting properties of the Ramsey allocations in an incomplete markets model
without capital. They show that, under the natural asset limit, if the process for aggregate shocks is ergodic, the
economy converges almost surely to the ﬁrst best steady state. If the process for aggregate shocks has an absorbing
state, the limiting allocation coincides with the steady state of a Ramsey model with complete markets where the
limiting value of taxes and debt depends on the value of the endogenous state variables at the time the absorbing
state is reached. Under a more stringent asset limit, the economy may not converge.
27The properties of the intertemporal wedge vary with the assumptions on preferences and technology. Analytical
results can be obtained only with quasi-linear preferences. Numerical simulations are used for general risk averse
preferences.
28In Aiyagari (1995), the Ramsey allocation does not feature permanent intertemporal distortions but is imple-
24Finally, consider the standard Ramsey model under a balanced-budget constraint on the gov-
ernment. Since the government must ﬁnance spending solely from current tax revenues, it cannot
save or borrow. Clearly, no admissible allocation converges to the ﬁrst-best steady state. Since
Condition 1 is su cient but not necessary, there are versions of the balanced-budget Ramsey model
that do not feature permanent intertemporal distortions. For example, if labor tax revenue is suf-
ﬁcient to ﬁnance government consumption, the steady state capital income tax is zero.29 However,
the predictions on intertemporal distortions are not typically robust in this class of models. 30
5.2 Risk-Sharing
We now discuss the presence of permanent intertemporal distortions in economies with idiosyncratic
risk in light of Theorem 1. There are many frictions leading to incomplete risk-sharing. We revisit
the two paradigms introduced in Section 2, models with self-enforcement constraints and models
with private information. In economies with self-enforcement constraints, assumptions on the out-
side option have a crucial role. Because of the variety of formulations in the literature, there are
contrasting implications for intertemporal distortions. We use Theorem 1 to clarify which features
of the formulation are critical for intertemporal distortions in the long run. By contrast, private
information economies typically exhibit permanent intertemporal distortions. As we will discuss,
even if the su cient condition does not hold in these economies, the front-loading principle still
applies.
5.2.1 Self-Enforcement Constraints
Let us return to the example of an economy with self-enforcement constraints introduced in Section
2.2.1, extending it to allow for a general process for the productivity shocks,  .
We concentrate on the role of the outside option. There are a variety of formulations in the lit-
erature. These assumptions shape the resulting self-enforcement constraints and determine whether
the su cient condition is satisﬁed. The speciﬁcation of the outside option necessarily involves the
distribution of capital in case of default, as well as the agents’ constraints after default.
We will consider two polar cases. The ﬁrst assumes that a defaulting agent can seize a fraction
    [0,1] of the aggregate capital and operate it under autarchy. The resulting self-enforcement
constraint is:
   
s=t
 s t  
 s| t
  ( s| t)u(ci( s),l i( s)/ s)   Vout( kt; t), (22)
mented with a positive capital tax. This tax o sets the distortion on the intertemporal margin arising from the
precautionary savings motive.
29See Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), as well as Stockman (2001).
30For example, Lansing (1999) shows that a zero capital tax is not optimal in a two-class economy with logarithmic
preferences and a balanced-budget constraint.
25where Vout satisﬁes:




   
s=t
 s tu(cs,l s/ s)
 
subject to
cs + ˆ ks+1   F(ˆ ks,l s)
with ˆ kt =  kt.
The value of the outside option, Vout, depends only on the level of aggregate capital at the time of
default. The self-enforcement constraint can be relaxed by awarding utility in future periods, which
is achieved via a back-loaded path of consumption. For a utilitarian social welfare function, the value
of capital on the equilibrium path is greater than in the outside option, and the self-enforcement
constraint is relaxed by raising capital. This property is preserved as long as the distribution of
Pareto weights is not too uneven. As in Kocherlakota (1996), Condition 1 will be satisﬁed if the
discount factor   is high enough, agents’ preferences exhibit a su cient degree of risk aversion or
the variance of the idiosyncratic shock is large enough.
The second case assumes that agents cannot accumulate capital after default or trade ﬁnancial
assets. Defaulting agents can still supply labor on competitive labor markets. Thus, the value of
their outside option is:




   
s=t+1





s   wsli
s,
where {ws}s t is the sequence of future equilibrium wages.
The value of the outside option, through its dependence on wages, now involves the entire future
path of capital. The resulting admissibility constraint does not comply with the general formulation
in (9). More importantly, the dependence of the value of the outside option on the future path of
capital generates a pecuniary externality. Since a rise in capital increases equilibrium wages and
consumption for defaulting agents, capital in future periods need not relax the self-enforcement
constraint.31 Even so, if agents are su ciently patient, the ﬁrst best allocation may satisfy the self-
enforcement constraint. The impact of additional capital on incentives will depend on the degree of
complementarity between labor and capital in production. This result is related to Davila, Hong,
Krusell and Rios-Rull (2007).




The international risk-sharing model of Kehoe and Perri (2002, 2004) is an interesting example of a
self-enforcement constraint of the form (22). Each agent i represents a country facing idiosyncratic
total factor productivity shocks. The world resource constraint can be written as:
 
i=1,2




t(ki,t) (li,t)1  ,
for all t. The formulation of the outside option implies that in case of default each country resorts to
autarchy. The resulting self-enforcement constraint depends only on the value of capital at default
and has the same structure as (22).
Kehoe and Perri (2002) show that the self-enforcement constraint generically distorts the Euler
equation, since transferring consumption to a future period a ects incentives. If the self-enforcement
constraint is binding at t+1, there is a beneﬁt from transferring consumption to time t+1to relax
this constraint. Speciﬁcally, reducing consumption at time t tightens the self-enforcement constraint
for periods 0   t, while increasing consumption at t +1relaxes all self-enforcement constraints for
periods 0 to t+1. Thus, on net, transferring consumption to t+1from t, relaxes more constraints
than it tightens.
The su cient condition is satisﬁed in this model if countries are weighted symmetrically in the
world social welfare function. Based on Theorem 1, intertemporal distortions will be temporary.
Ramsey taxation
Chien and Lee (2008) study a Ramsey model with self-enforcement constraints. The government
optimally sets linear taxes on labor and capital income. Defaulting agents supply labor on compet-
itive markets and are subject to labor income taxes, but they cannot borrow or save. Crucially, the
marginal tax rate on labor income cannot be conditional on default. It follows that the structure of
the self-enforcement constraint is the same as in (23). They show that the limiting Ramsey equi-
librium allocation does not feature intertemporal distortions, but the capital income tax is positive
provided some self-enforcement constraints remain binding. This result resembles Aiyagari (1995),
where instead of self-enforcement constraints, agents face arbitrary net worth constraints. In both
environments there are no intertemporal distortions in the aggregate or in the individual allocation;
however, the capital tax is positive to equate the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution across
constrained and unconstrained agents.
5.2.3 Private Information
We now consider the same economy under the assumption that the idiosyncratic preference shocks,
 , are private information.
27Generalizing (5), the incentive compatibility constraint is:
   
t=0
 t  
 t
  ( t)u(ci( t),l i( t)/ t)  
   
t=0
 t  
 t
  ( t)u(ci(˜  t),l i(˜  t)/ t) (24)
for all  t and ˜  t in  t. Constraint (24) requires consumption to be spread out across states, in
particular, consumption at time t should be increasing in  t if the single crossing condition holds.
Thus, the ﬁrst best is not incentive compatible and Condition 1 does not hold. It is a well known
result that, if utility is separable between consumption and labor, the second best allocation features
a permanent intertemporal wedge.32 We can express this property as:
uc(ci( t); t)    Fk
 
 t+1| t
  ( t+1| t)uc(ci( t+1); t+1), (25)
where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use uc(c; ) to denote the marginal utility of consumption
for an agent with current type  . This inequality is strict when agents are risk averse and face
idiosyncratic risk in the subsequent periods.
The incentive-compatibility constraint (24) is equivalent, with mild restrictions, to a sequence
of incentive compatibility constraints over the continuation allocation.33 Adopting this formulation
is useful for understanding the forces that give rise to the intertemporal wedge. Consider the gov-
ernment’s trade-o  in the allocation of consumption between two consecutive periods. If the future
incentive compatibility constraint is binding, there is a shadow cost of transferring consumption to
future periods. This cost reﬂects the fact that to preserve incentives, future consumption must be
spread across states and will be worth less in terms of utility. Thus, an agent’s optimal consumption
allocation must be front-loaded. Since agents value a smooth consumption path, there is a trade-
o  between smoothing consumption over time and minimizing the resource cost of a consumption
allocation as long as future incentive compatibility constraints are binding.
Future incentive compatibility constraints will always be binding if agents are risk averse and face
idiosyncratic shocks, leading to a permanent intertemporal distortion. If instead   has an absorbing
state that is reached with positive probability, intertemporal distortions will be temporary. For
example, Werning (2007) examines an economy with ﬁxed   and shows that there are no permanent
intertemporal distortions.
The front-loaded path of consumption under private information stands in contrast with the
back-loaded path of consumption that arises with self-enforcement constraints of type (22).34 De-
spite this di erence, admissibility constraints are relaxed over time and distortions are front-loaded
in both environments. In the self-enforcement economy, promising more consumption in the fu-
ture relaxes both the current and the future admissibility constraints. By contrast, in the private
32See Rogerson (1985) and Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003). Albanesi (2006) examines an economy
with idiosyncratic capital income risk in which the intertemporal wedge has the opposite sign.
33See Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Green (1987).
34See Chapter 19 of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for a discussion.
28information economy, awarding more consumption in the future relaxes the current incentive com-
patibility constraint but tightens future constraints. The front-loaded path of consumption is a way
to relax future incentive compatibility constraints.
5.3 Limited Commitment
The government’s policy choices may be constrained by a lack of commitment or by political economy
considerations. These constraints often can be formulated in primal form and analyzed within our
framework. A few examples of such environments are Fisher (1980), Chari and Kehoe (1990), Sleet
and Yeltekin (2006b), Yared (2007), and Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008a, 2008b).
Theorem 1 can be used to derive a general result for models with a benevolent government with
limited commitment. We show that Condition 1 is always satisﬁed when the government maximizes
social welfare, so that limited commitment alone never leads to permanent intertemporal distor-
tions. We then consider settings where the government is self-interested. Speciﬁcally, we analyze a
simpliﬁed version of Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008a), where the allocation of resources
is chosen by a rent-seeking ruler who has limited commitment. We discuss the determinants of
intertemporal distortions in light of Theorem 1 and relate it to economies with self-enforcement
constraints.
5.3.1 Benevolent Government
We start with the case of benevolent policymaker. Under limited commitment, an allocation  
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This admissibility constraint resembles the self-enforcement condition (22). Since the policy-
maker is benevolent, the continuation allocation is evaluated according to the social welfare func-
tion, U. The outside option Vout (·) may depend on the continuation allocation and the current
state of the economy. A variety of speciﬁcations for the outside options have been considered. The
most widely adopted is the notion of sustainable equilibrium developed by Chari and Kehoe (1990),
where the outside option corresponds to a beneﬁcial temporary deviation followed by a reversion to
the worst subgame perfect equilibrium. For example, Reis (2006) analyzes a framework in which
the worst sustainable equilibrium corresponds to ﬁnancial autarchy for the government.
It is well known that the outside option plays a critical role in models with limited commitment,
and it is hard to discriminate between the many possible speciﬁcations. However, since any outside
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Thus, there exists an admissible allocation that converges to the ﬁrst best limiting allocation and
Condition 1 is satisﬁed.
The application of Theorem 1 clariﬁes that limited commitment alone will not give rise to per-
manent intertemporal distortions and that this is a robust property of this class of second best
economies. Limited commitment may give rise to permanent intertemporal distortions in com-
bination with other frictions. Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001) study
sustainable equilibria in an economy where the government is subject to a balanced budget con-
straint. Since the government is unable to save, the limiting ﬁrst best allocation is not admissible
and the su cient condition is violated, as discussed in Section 5.1. Then, sustainable equilibria can
display permanent intertemporal distortions.
5.3.2 Self-Interested Policymaker
We now turn to environments where the policymaker is not benevolent. As an example, we consider
a simpliﬁed version of the economy in Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a, 2008b) with no
aggregate or idiosyncratic risk. The economy is populated by two types of agents. A continuum of
identical private agents value streams of consumption and labor, according to standard preferences.
In addition, a rent-seeking ruler values streams of transfers {Tt}t 0 according to the utility function:
   
t=0
 tv(Tt),
where v(·) is strictly increasing and concave with v(0) = 0 and     (0,1).
The social welfare function for this economy can be written as:
   
t=0
 tu(ct,l t)+ 
   
t=0
 tv(Tt),
allowing a positive Pareto weight,     0, for the ruler. This formulation clariﬁes the conﬂict over
the distribution of resources between private agents and the ruler.
The ruler can capture a fraction of aggregate output by resorting to expropriation. Thus, any
admissible allocation must satisfy:
 
j 0
 jv(Tt+j)   v( F(kt,l t)), (27)















then the set of admissible allocations is empty.
30resents the fraction of aggregate output that the ruler can extract.36 This admissibility constraint
has the same structure as the self-enforcement condition in (22).
Is it possible to ﬁnd an allocation that satisﬁes (27) and converges to the ﬁrst best? In the
ﬁrst best steady state, the ruler is awarded a constant share of output and her consumption is
constant. As in models with self-enforcement constraints, the ﬁrst best steady-state is admissible
if the discount factor is high enough, for a given  . It is also admissible if   is low enough. In
particular, if   =0the admissibility constraint is trivially satisﬁed and the limited commitment
problem disappears. Finally, the ﬁrst best steady state is admissible if the ruler’s weight in the
social welfare function,  , is large enough. Thus, even if the policymaker is not benevolent, limited
commitment will not lead to permanent intertemporal distortions as long as the conﬂict over the
distribution of resources is not too severe.
Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2008a) also allow the ruler to have a di erent intertemporal
discount factor,  , and show that for      , there are no intertemporal distortions in the limit.37
While our framework does not allow for heterogeneity in discount factors, it is still possible to relate
this result to Condition 1.38 For      , the ﬁrst best allocation speciﬁes a growing consumption
share for the ruler. The ﬁrst best allocation must then satisfy the admissibility constraint after a
ﬁnite number of periods, and it easy to see that it will always be possible to ﬁnd a transition path
that is admissible and converges to the ﬁrst best steady state.
6 Conclusion
Theorem 1 clariﬁes that in second best economies, permanent intertemporal distortions arise only
if future admissibility constraints are binding. Our uniﬁed approach is critical for this insight, since
it allows us to identify an optimality principle that is common across a broad class of environments.
In all of these economies, the optimal allocation front-loads distortions. If our su cient condition
holds, all distortions can be front-loaded. The implication here is that intertemporal distortions
will be temporary since eventually, no future admissibility constraints will bind. On the other hand,
since intratemporal distortions depend on the path of past binding constraints, these typically will
persist in the long run.
A natural question is how applicable the logic of Theorem 1 is to environments outside our
general framework. Our argument requires restrictions on the degree of history dependence in the
admissibility constraints. In Section 5.2, we discussed an economy with self-enforcement constraints
in which this restriction is not satisﬁed, where the general logic still applies. However, it is hard to
derive general conditions for the validity of the front-loading principle without placing restrictions
on history dependence of the admissibility constraints.
Our analysis presumes the existence of a second best plan that weakly converges to a limiting
stationary allocation. Interestingly, in many economies that feature permanent intertemporal dis-
36Following expropriation, the ruler looses power and obtains no transfers.
37See also Sleet and Yeltekin (2006b).
38In addition, the constrained e cient allocation may not satisfy the interiority assumptions we have made.
31tortions, the second best allocation does not converge. Private information economies are a notable
example.39 It is well known that imposing a lower bound on continuation utility, as in Atkeson and
Lucas (1995), or allowing the government to discount the future at a lower rate than do private
agents,40 as in Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning (2007), will guarantee the existence of a non-
degenerate limiting distribution. Yet, the optimal allocation still features permanent intertemporal
distortions, suggesting that for this class of economies, the presence of intertemporal distortions does
not depend on the convergence properties of the optimal allocation. By contrast, in the Ramsey
model with incomplete markets analyzed by Farhi (2007) , when an ad hoc asset limit is binding and
the su cient condition does not hold, the Ramsey allocation does not converge and intertemporal
distortions are permanent. An analysis of the link between the convergence properties of the second
best allocation and the presence of intertemporal distortions would be of clear interest. We leave
this topic for future work.
Finally, we consider only inﬁnite-horizon economies. Erosa and Gervais (2002), Garriga (2003),
and Krueger, Conesa, and Kitao (2008) analyze overlapping generation Ramsey models where it
may be optimal to tax capital. Overlapping generations economies often can display dynamic
ine ciencies, possibly providing a rationale for capital taxation absent from inﬁnite horizon Ramsey
models. In addition, with overlapping generations, shifting distortions over time entails a transfer
across generations. A uniﬁed analysis of intertemporal distortions in overlapping generations and
inﬁnite-horizon economies would be very interesting to pursue, but is beyond the scope of this
paper. A more extensive discussion of the determinants of intertemporal distortions in overlapping
generations is available in Albanesi and Armenter (2007).
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35A Proofs for Stage 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The set of plans   is a complete vector space with the sup norm. U, F, and all terms in H are
real-valued and twice di erentiable functions by Assumptions 2, 3, and 4. Let    be a second best
plan and a  an auxiliary variable plan such that {  ,a  } is admissible. By Assumption 6,    is a
regular point of all the binding constraints in Problem 14 given a . All conditions are satisﬁed thus
to apply the generalized Kuhn-Tucker theorem (See Luenberger (1997), page 294) and characterize
the solution    with the Lagrangian
 ( ; , , )=U (x;s0)
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is a vector collecting the M Lagrangian multipliers associated with the admissibility










are vectors similarly stacked.

































































































































Similarly, the f.o.n.c. for labor li
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Finally the ﬁrst order for aggregate capital k
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(28)-(30), and the resource constraint (6) is a function of the aggregate shock zt, the realization
of the idiosyncratic shock  t, the stock of aggregate capital k
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, and the constants
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      S   K
and
fx :    X,
fk :    K.
37The dependence on the constants
 ¯  0
i, ¯  1
i
 
will henceforth be omitted for ease of notation. The
functions fx and fk do not describe all the allocations in the economy, but only those in continuations
nodes of a given sd    d. Under Assumptions 2, 3, and 4, both fx and fk are bounded.
Let  i ( ) :     be given by:

























for some i   I, where we have written uc




and so on. Moreover, Assumptions 3 and 4
implies that ﬁrst derivatives of ui, h0
m, and h1






i is strictly positive. It follows that for all      ,  i ( ) is bounded above and below.
Deﬁne the operator   on bounded functions as:
 [ i]( )=
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and    is given by
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if and only if:
 [ i]( )   ( ) i ( ).
By Assumptions 1 and 8, there must exist an an ergodic set       . That is, if        then
   = {s ,f k ( )}     for all realizations of s    S. We derive the two key properties of operator  
in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let    be an ergodic set. If for all       :
 [ i]( )    i ( ),
then,
 [ i]( )= i ( ), (32)
for all       .
If , instead, for all       :
 [ i]( )    i ( ),
38then,
 [ i]( )= i ( ), (33)
for all       .
Proof. Let  u     be such that  i ( u) = sup{ i ( ):      }. This exists since operator   is
bounded on   .
If  u      then  [ i]( u) =  i ( u) as  i ( )   z implies  [ i]( )   z. By ergodicity, all
continuations    = {s ,f k ( u)} satisfy  i ( u)    i (  ). Therefore  [ i]( u)= i ( u) implies
 i ( u)= i (  ) for all continuations    = {s ,f k ( u)}. Hence for any     ˆ  = {       : i ( ) =  i ( u)},
all    = {s ,f k ( )}  ˆ   and thus ˆ  =   . It follows that  [ i]( )= i ( ) for all       .
If  u       note that  [ i]( u)    i ( u) by the continuity of  i and  . If  [ i]( u) >  i ( u)
then there exist a continuation ˆ    = {ˆ s,fk ( u)} with  i (ˆ   ) >  i ( u). Consider a sequence { n}
in    such that  n    u and construct the sequence {ˆ  n}     given by ˆ  n+1 = {ˆ s,fk ( n)}.
Since  i (ˆ  n)    i (ˆ   ) there exists m such that  i (ˆ  m) >  i ( u) contradicting ˆ  m     . Hence
 [ i]( u)= i ( u) and the reasoning for case  u      applies as well. This proves the ﬁrst state-








































can be expressed as a continuous function of allocations on a compact support, the





















If    =0then  [ i]( )    i ( ) for all       . By Lemma 1 then  [ i]( ) =  i ( ) for all












The same argument applies for
















































which proves the result.





























The same reasoning applies if  i
 
st 
< 0 for all st   St.
B Proofs for Stage 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Condition 1 implies that there exists an allocation ˜   and a plan for the auxiliary variable ˜ a   A 
such that:
Hm,i( ˜  ,st)   ˜ aim(st),
and:
˜ a(st+1)    (˜ a(st),s t),
for all st   St for t   0, i   I,m   M and all ˜ a0   A, with the property that the sequence of
probability measures {˜ µt} on K   X associated with ˜   converges weakly to µ
fb
 .
Deﬁne ¯ at = max
st St
 
H( ˜  ,st)
 
for all t   0 and ˆ at = max{¯ at,ˆ at 1} for all t   1, where the
maximum is taken componentwise and ˆ a0 =˜ a0. Since ˜   is admissible, each element in the sequence
{  at} is in A. By construction, the sequence {ˆ at} is monotone increasing. Since A is a compact set,
lim
t  










{Hm,i( fb,s j)}  ˆ a ,
for all i   I,m   M.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3
If     Afb the result is trivial. If     int( ( ,s)) for some s   S, then the result follows from
Assumption 5. Consider thus  /   Afb and      int( ( ,s)) for all s. By Assumption 5,      ( ,s)
and thus   is an adjacent point to  ( ,s). Since the image of  ( ,s) is a convex set by Assumption
5, we apply the Separating Hyperplane Theorem to ﬁnd a half-space  s = {    A : p    p     }
with p  =   0, such that  ( ,s)    s for a given s   S.
We now show that for some s   S, Afb    s  =   for any half-space  s. We proceed by
contradiction. Assume that for every s   S there exists a half-space  s such that Afb    s =  .
Condition 1 implies that the set Afb is non-empty by Proposition 2 and that for some s    S,
there exists x    s  with y    (x,s ), y     s . Otherwise there would be no admissible plan with
a0    s  that would converge to Afb.
Let w   A satisfy   =  w+(1    )x for some     (0,1). Such a point will belong to the closure
of the complement of  s , the set {    A : p    p     }. Since w    (w,s ), the convexity of  
implies that  y+(1    )w    ( ,s ) but  y+(1    )w     s . Thus, we reach a contradiction and
therefore Afb   s  =   for some s   S.
Finally, consider the set:
G =
 
(1    )  +       A :     (0,1],     Afb
 
.
This is a convex set with Afb   G. If  ( ,s) G =   for all s   S, it would then be possible to ﬁnd
a separating hyperplane  s for each s with  ( ,s)    s and G    s  =  . This would contradict
our previous result. Thus for some s   S,  ( ,s)   G  =   and the result follows.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let    be a second best plan and assume that Condition 1 holds. We prove the result by constructing
an auxiliary variable plan a  such that {  ,a  } is admissible and limt    
 
st    t
 
=1 . We start
with two Lemmas that will be useful to characterize the choice of a .












for some st   St. Then there exists an admissible plan ˜ a with ˜ a(st) >a (st) and ˜ a(sj)   a(sj)for
all sj   Sj|st; and ˜ a(sj)=a(sj) elsewhere. Moreover if a
 
sj 
  int(A) for all sj   Sj|st then ˜ a
can be found such that ˜ a(sj) >a (sj)for all sj   Sj|st.












. Let ˜ a = a ev-
erywhere but in the set
 
Sj|st : j   t
 
















  int(A) and thus a
 
st 





=    + (1    )a
 
st 

















=    + (1    )a
 
st+1 








Construct ˜ a for all sj   Sj|st, j   t+1by iteration. The plan ˜ a is admissible and ˜ a(sj)   a(sj)for
all sj   Sj|st by the deﬁnition of   and  > 0. The corollary follows trivially
The second Lemma uses the quasi-concavity of W.
Lemma 3 Let { ,a} be admissible, with U (x,s0)=W (a). Then for all admissible a  such that





for all sj   Sj|st then either W (a ) >W(a) or there exists an admissible pair {  ,a  } such that
U (x ,s 0)=W (a ) and st     
t.
Proof. The ﬁrst part is trivial as { ,a } is admissible so W (a ) cannot be worse than W (a). Let





. If W (a )=W (a) then U (x,s0)=W (a ) so setting    =   we have
st     
t
Since    is admissible, there exists at least one auxiliary variable plan a such that {  ,a} is
admissible. The sequence
 
 (st    t)
 
t is weakly increasing and every element belongs to [0,1],
hence it converges. If limt    
 
st    t
 
=1the result is proved by equating a with a .
If limt    
 
st    t
 
< 1, let ˜ S    S  be the subset of histories such that
st     t
for all t   0. If a
 
st 
  Afb for any t and s    ˜ S , then by Assumption 5 there exists an





for all sj   Sj|st, a  = a elsewhere.
Clearly a   
sj 
  Afb for all sj   Sj|st and thus by Assumption 7 we have that st     
t and {  ,a  }
is admissible. By induction either we ﬁnd an admissible a  with limt    
 




proves the result; or for some plan a with {  ,a} admissible we have that a
 
st 
   Afb for all
st   s    ˜ S .













st   ˜ S . If a
 
sj 
  int(A) for all sj   Sj|st then by Lemma 2 there exists another admissible a 
with a (st) >a (st) (component-wise) for all sj   Sj|st, a  = a elsewhere. By Lemma 3 we have
that st     




   int(A) because am,i
 
sj 
=0for some m,i. If a
 
sj 




for some m,i then by Assumption 5 we can work with the subspace ¯ A = {    A :  m,i =¯ a} for
all sd   Sd|sj. By Proposition 2, Afb  =   and follows that the vector   = [¯ a]m,i (the join
42of A) must belong to Afb. Since a
 
sj 
   Afb, a
 
sj 










on ¯ A we can apply Lemma 2 again. By induction either we ﬁnd a plan a 
such that {  ,a  } is admissible with limt    
 
st     
t
 
=1 , which proves the result; or for some
admissible plan a we have that a
 
st 
   Afb and a
 
st 









for all st   s    ˜ S .
It follows that we ﬁnd a such that {  ,a} is admissible and satisﬁes either (i) limt    
 
st    t
 
=
1 or (ii) a
 
st 
   Afb, a
 
st 









for all st   s    ˜ S . Let a be an admissible
plan that satisﬁes (ii) and deﬁne:
B ( )=
 
     A :    > 
 
where the inequality is taken component-wise.
Lemma 4 Let {  ,a} be an admissible plan. For all st 1   St 1 such that a
 
st 1 













st 1  
 =  .
Proof. By Proposition 3 there exists one st and  > 0, such that  a
 
st 1 






















st 1  
 =  











st 1  














st 1  






st 1  






component-wise. For the latter, the steps in Lemma 2 and the previous argument show
that there exists a  such that {  ,a  } is admissible and st     








st 1  
for all states.











st 1  
 =  . If such event is











st 1  
 =   then a
that converges to   = [¯ a]m,i. We use here the fact that the second best is proper, so Afb  =  . Thus
there exists a ﬁnite d such that a
 
sd 
  Afb and we can apply the previous argument.











st 1  
 =  
is not recurrent has measure zero. For a given node sd   s    ˜ S , let Pj for j   d be the











st 1  
 =   has occurred for some t   j and st   St|sd.
Since sd   s    ˜ S , a
 
st 1 












st 1  
 =   occurs. By Assumption 1,   (st)    > 0, so
Pt   Pt 1 +   (1   Pt 1).











st 1  
 =  
is not recurrent has measure zero. It follows that limt    
 
st    t
 
=1 .
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